ABSTRACT. This paper studies greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission controls in the presence of carbon leakage through international firm relocation. The Kyoto Protocol requires developed countries to reduce GHG emissions by a certain amount. Comparing emission quotas with emission taxes, we show that taxes coupled with lower trade costs facilitate more firm relocations than quotas do, causing more international carbon leakage. Thus, if a country is concerned about global emissions, emission quotas would be adopted to mitigate the carbon leakage. Firm relocation entails a trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. Emission regulations may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice versa.
INTRODUCTION
Global environmental problems have recently attracted considerable worldwide attention. In particular, global warming caused by greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions has been the central issue among the problems. To cope with global warming, an international environmental treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was made at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Then the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP3) in December 1997. 1 In the protocol, the industrialized countries called Annex I Parties made a commitment to decrease their GHG emissions by 5.2% compared to their 1990 baseline levels over the 2008 to 2012 period. However, the United States, which is a signatory to the protocol, has not ratified the protocol. Moreover, developing countries including China and India have no obligation to the reduction.
There is no doubt that the Kyoto Protocol is a significant step towards the reduction of GHG emissions. Obviously, however, the partial participation of certain countries in the framework of GHG emission reduction is a vital drawback. In particular, the United States and China are the largest GHG emitters in the world.
2 Moreover, with partial participation, a serious concern is international carbon leakage.
That is, the reduction of GHG emissions in some countries increases those in other countries. As a result, worldwide emissions may rise.
International carbon leakage occurs through a number of channels. For example, it may occur through fuel price changes (Ishikawa and Kiyono, 2000; Kiyono and Ishikawa, 2004) . When a country adopts policies to reduce GHG emissions, its demand for fossil fuels is likely to decrease. If their world prices fall as a result, the demand for fossil fuels rises in other countries with weak regulations.
Carbon leakage may also arise through the changes in a country's industrial structures (Copeland and Taylor 2005; Ishikawa and Kiyono, 2006) . With stringent GHG emission regulations, the comparative advantage of the emission-intensive industry may shift abroad. This is the so-called pollution haven hypothesis. In particular, in response to environmental policy differences across countries, firms may relocate to countries with lax environmental regulations (Markusen et al., 1993 (Markusen et al., , 1995 . Recent improvements in transportation and communications technology as well as trade liberalization allow firms to relocate their plants more easily.
In this paper, we compare emission taxes with emission quotas (including creation of a competitive emission-permit market) in the presence of the possibility of firm relocation. Specifically, using a new economic geography (NEG) framework, we examine the effects of trade costs on emission taxes and quotas. In our model, there are two countries (North and South), two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing), and two factors (capital and labour). The agricultural product, which perfectly competitive firms produce from labour alone with constant-returns-scale (CRS) technology, is freely traded internationally. The manufactured products are subject to the DixitStiglitz (1977) type of monopolistic competition and are costly to ship internationally.
Following Martin and Rogers (1995) , we assume that only capital is mobile across countries and determines plant location. The North government unilaterally adopts an environmental policy, either an emission tax or an emission quota. Then we consider the effects of these policies when trade costs fall and firms are free to relocate to South.
One of our main results is as follows. If North cares only about local emissions, then North prefers emission taxes to emission quotas. On the other hand, if
North is concerned about global emissions, then emission quotas should be adopted.
This result has interesting implications for the Kyoto Protocol when regarding Annex I Parties as North. As mentioned above, the target for GHG emission reductions set by Annex I Parties in the protocol is a local one. In the presence of firm relocation from Annex I Parties to the other countries, therefore, trade liberalization may induce Annex I Parties to adopt emission taxes rather than emission quotas to achieve the target. From the viewpoint of worldwide emission reduction, however, emission quotas are more effective.
Another main result is that when emission taxes are adopted in North to attain a target of global emission reduction, trade costs and tax rates must satisfy certain conditions. Intuitively, lower trade costs coupled with tougher regulations facilitate firm relocation, which leads to carbon leakage. Thus, free firm relocation entails a trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. Emission regulations may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice versa.
There are many papers that examine the pollution haven hypothesis. In the framework of an open economy, the first theoretical analysis on the hypothesis is Pethig (1976) . 4 Then Markusen et al. (1993 Markusen et al. ( , 1995 investigate the hypothesis in the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI). In Markusen et al. (1993) , two polluting firms (one is local and the other is foreign) choose the number of plant and plant locations when only the home country adopts emission taxes. They are primarily concerned with market structures induced by taxes. In Markusen et al. (1995) , a single firm decides the plant number and locations when both countries adopt environmental policies non-cooperatively. The governments have an incentive to lower (raise) environmental standards to attract (deter) investment if the benefit from investment is greater (less) than the loss (i.e., the environmental damage).
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Firm locations and trade costs are central issues in the NEG literature. A few NEG studies investigate environmental policies (Pfluger, 2001; Venables, 2001; Elbers and Withagen, 2004) . 6 Pfluger (2001) considers Pigouvian emission taxes in a NEG model similar to ours. However, his analysis is along the line of Markusen et al. (1995) . Thus, environmental damages are local and governments can detect emitters, estimate the damage and can impose optimal emission taxes. In contrast, emissions in our model are global and hence it is hard to identify polluters and estimate emissions damage. This makes it impossible to levy a tax on each polluter and compensate the public through tax reimbursement. In our paper, global warming is an impending issue and each country is required to reduce total emissions by a certain amount.
A key mechanism of environmental policies is agglomeration rent, which is discussed somewhat similarly in the literature of tax competition. The NEG literature has been exploring taxation on agglomeration rent (Kind et al., 1998; Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004) . However, our environmental policies are substantially different from corporate tax competition and agglomeration rent in spirit and purpose: 1) A reduction of emissions is an obligation in international agreements. Taxation is aimed at reducing emissions to a certain level rather than affecting tax revenue. On the other hand, corporate taxation is intended to absorb agglomeration rent and raise tax revenue; 2) Tax competition is not plausible in our paper. Only developed countries ratify the international agreements and thus taxation is unilateral in our North-South model. The environmental policies are mandatory across ratified countries so as to reduce emissions to satisfy the agreements. Thus, the international environmental agreements leave no room for tax competition to increase government revenue, i.e., a race-to-top or race-to-bottom in the tax rate; and 3) Our discussion involves how to reduce global emissions while refraining from using a pollution haven under trade liberalization. In contrast, tax competition studies show how each government seeks to maximize tax revenue by attracting more firms and widening the tax base.
Turning to the environment and trade literature, Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) analyse the potential effects of choices over emission controls in an open economy. Here the income effect means that higher income reduces pollution.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our basic model. Emission taxes and quotas are investigated in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Then, in Section 5, we compare emission taxes with emission quotas. In Section 6, we explore the relationship between emission regulations and trade liberalization. Section 7 concludes the paper. This implies that free trade, τ = 1, can be expressed as = 1 whereas = 0 represents autarchy (τ = ∞).
BASIC MODEL
Turning to the demand side, a representative consumer has the following quasi-linear utility function: Labour is mobile between sectors but immobile between countries. While capital is mobile between two nations, capital owners are immobile and thus capital 9 The equilibrium path in the FC model with a quasi-linear utility function is identical to that of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. The quasi-linear function eliminates the income effect (See Baldwin, et al. 2003). rewards are repatriated to the country of origin. Because capital endowment is initially allocated in proportion to labour endowment (market size), North's share of initial capital and labour endowments are given by sK =
However, after the firm has relocated, capital share is generally not equal to population share, whereas population share always corresponds to labour share, sL, and capital share is always identical to firm share, 
Initial equilibrium
Because the A-sector good is the numéraire and is freely traded internationally, wage rates in both countries are normalized to one, w = w* = 1. Utility maximization results in the well-known CES demand function. As a result of maximization, local and export prices of the product variety of the North-based M-sector firm are given by:
where "a" is unit labour requirement, equal to marginal cost, which is exogenously given as a constant. Consumption per variety is:
Using (2) and (3), pure profit for a representative firm in North is given by:
where E (E*) represents the North's (South's) expenditure, and ∆ and ∆* are defined
Because our model has asymmetric market size, E(= s) > E*(= 1 -s), i.e., s > 0.5, pure profit of a North-based firm is higher than that of a South-based firm with positive trade costs. Therefore, allowing for free relocation, the pure profits are equalized and then firm shares, n are determined as locational equilibrium.
Solving (4), we obtain ) 2
As trade costs fall (a rise in ), n increases: more South firms go to North, so-called gradual agglomeration. Then, below a certain trade cost, called the sustain point ( = (1 -s)/s ), all firms concentrate in North, i.e., full agglomeration. That is, trade costs above the sustain point (small trade costs) create full agglomeration in the big country as a stable equilibrium. For simplicity, we first consider full agglomeration before considering any environmental policy. Accordingly, trade costs discussed in our paper are assumed to be from the sustain point through free trade: (1 -s)/s < < 1.
Production and GHG emissions
The quantity produced by each North-based firm (j) for the North market is given by For simplicity, we assume that producing one unit of goods entails one unit of GHG emissions. Thus, the amount of local emissions in each country corresponds to each country's total quantity produced. Local emission levels in North and South are, respectively, defined as: 
EMISSION TAX

Taxation without relocation
Now we introduce environmental policies. Because of international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, an industrialized country, which has manufacturing agglomeration, namely North, is required to limit emissions to a certain fixed level. To satisfy the upper bound of emissions, we assume that North introduces either an emission tax or quota. In this section, we examine an emission tax.
Starting from full agglomeration, North imposes an emission tax so as to reduce emissions and implement the international agreement. At this moment, relocation is prohibited (infinitive relocation costs). Because one unit of GHG emissions corresponds to one unit of quantity produced in our model, an emission tax needs to be levied on each unit of production rather than prices, pure profits or sales.
Thus, the emission tax is equivalent to a specific production tax, t. Then the total costs and prices are expressed as: The tax increases total costs and prices. 13 Thus, pure profit of a North-based firm and the North's emissions without relocation are given as: 13 Note that we assume a + t < 1.
Equilibrium with free relocation
Next, we allow for free firm relocation. Because taxation decreases profits in North, firms may have an incentive to move to the non-taxed country, i.e., South, regardless of a small market size. When tax rates are set at a substantial level such that π < π*, i.e., φ φ )( 1 ( t a n a n . 
In reverse, given a fixed , a low tax can sustain full agglomeration. The condition for the low tax rate is given as:
. When the tax rate is above t , North never sustains full agglomeration for any trade cost and instead South is more likely to achieve full agglomeration. Figure 2 illustrates the case of high tax rates without North's full agglomeration.
<Figure 2>
As shown in Figures 1 and 2 Note that the standard FC model (without any taxation) has hump-shaped agglomeration rents, which is a net benefit from agglomeration (see Baldwin and Krugman, 2004) : when trade costs decrease, the rents first rise and then fall. Free trade has no agglomeration rents. Taxation on the rents reduces the net benefit from agglomeration. Thus, large or small trade costs lead to a negative net agglomeration benefit, which causes firm relocation to South. Note that South's emissions exceed North's for certain levels of . As trade costs fall, firm relocation decreases n and then, when t a t a n + + < 2 holds, the South's emissions exceed the North's. Lower tax rates lead to a critical n of 0.5, and higher tax rates increase the critical n. This means that lowering tax rates can moderate carbon leakage. 
EMISSION QUOTA
Quota without relocation
Now we discuss the other policy, an emission quota. In this case, starting from full agglomeration, North unilaterally introduces an emission quota so as to satisfy international environmental agreements. To make a strict comparison of policy impact on carbon leakage in the tax case, the quota is set so that the emission level under the quota is the same as that under taxation at the initial equilibrium (North's full agglomeration), i.e., t a + = 1 χ (constant). Moreover, the quota is assumed to be accompanied by creation of a competitive emission-permit market in North. The quota is implemented by the North government via a fee. Purchasing one unit of the permit allows one unit of production for a North firm. Using (6), the level of the quota is given by:
Thus, the price of emission permit q is equal to t at full agglomeration (initial equilibrium), i.e., q = t.
The following should be noted. The price of permit, q, is endogenously determined by the number of firms located in North and trade costs so as to satisfy Firm location is determined by profit equalization and the size of the quota.
Equilibrium with free relocation
At the equilibrium, n and q are determined by pure profit equalization as well as the emission constraint: )( 1 ( q a n a n . 
EMISSION TAX VERSUS QUOTA
Here, we make a comparison with two-policy effects on emissions. The only target of the North government is to implement the international environmental agreement and reduce North's local GHG emissions.
The first finding is related to tax rates and the quota price. Because international agreements allocate a certain amount of GHG emissions to North, χ , tax rates and the price for the permit in the quota system are all equal (t = q ) as long as all firms concentrate in North. For this reason, both policies have the same full agglomeration range: the same levels of NL φ and NU φ . This implies that firm relocation begins at the same critical trade costs. However, relocation to South caused by environmental regulations results in q being less than t for a given (i.e., t > q) (see Appendix for an analytical derivation). The tax rate is fixed, but the fee for the emission permit is endogenously determined by the number of North firms. As more firms relocate to South, the emission constraint can be more easily attained and then the permit price decreases. Furthermore, when many firms move to South, the permit price drastically decreases, which hampers firm relocation. To summarize:
Proposition 6: The price of the emission permit under a quota is always lower than the per unit emission tax rate in the presence of relocation.
In other words, we can say that the quota has a weaker relocation effect than tax. As is clear in Figure 9 , carbon leakage is moderate under the quota. Because tax has a stronger relocation effect, it always leads to more carbon leakage and full agglomeration in South.
<Figure 9>
Turning to global emissions, this implies that the emission in North is larger with a quota than with taxation for any (see Appendix for derivation). Therefore, in this case the target level of global emissions can be achieved for any trade cost: χ = 1/(a + t). It is necessary that international agreements specify the target level of emissions as well as the internationally levied tax rate. The common tax rate is the key to the implementation. In this case, trade liberalization is not hampered by environmental policy, because there is no international carbon leakage.
If both countries ratify the agreement, global GHG emissions could be reduced below the target, χ < χ = 1/(a + t). In addition to the given global target, χ 1/(a + t), international agreements state that tax rate, t, is a lower bound and allows for a higher tax rate on the condition that full agglomeration can be kept in North. 17 When
North suffers large damage from global warming, North will have an incentive to set a tax rate higher than t by υ (i.e., υ + t). This tax rate is defined by:
When freeness of trade is (1 -s)/s or 1, the additional tax rate υ is zero. Otherwise, υ is strictly positive. υ is hump-shaped with respect to freeness of trade. As shown in 
CONCLUSION
This paper studied the impact of environmental policies on firm location and carbon leakage when international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol require the ratified countries to reduce emissions by a certain amount. We have compared two environmental policy tools, emission tax and quota, under trade liberalization.
We have found the following. 1) When trade costs are small, either environmental policy leads firms to relocate to a country without any environmental regulation, which causes international carbon leakage. Thus, either environmental policy causes carbon leakage with free trade and free relocations. 2) An emission tax results in more firm relocation than a quota. Thus, an emission tax causes more carbon leakage, increasing global emissions. If North is concerned with only local emissions, a tax is adopted to attain the reduction target. On the other hand, if North is concerned with global emissions, a quota is preferred. Thus, a quota is a better policy tool to cope with global warming. 3) Trade liberalization and environmental policies are a trade-off when environmental agreements are unilateral. Trade liberalization may hamper international environmental agreements. Under certain combinations of tax rates and trade costs, a target reduction in global GHG emissions can be attained.
Our paper is the first step in exploring the relationship between trade liberalization and environmental policies in the presence of firm relocation. This paper has some limitations. For example, the policy target in this paper is to reduce GHG emissions to highlight the different policy effects of a tax and a quota. Of course, it is plausible to think that governments maximize social welfare. Welfare analysis and socially optimal policies are a subject for future research. Because our model assumes one unit of emission per unit of quantity produced, production and emissions are subject to a perfect trade-off: more production (consumption) positively affects welfare but simultaneously has a negative effect through increased emissions. There might exist an optimal level of emissions and production, which hinges on the specification of a social welfare function. To conduct welfare analysis formally, we have to specify disutility in the utility function more rigorously, taking into account trans-boundary/local emissions and accumulation of emissions over time.
Furthermore, it might be worthwhile considering the negative impact of emissions on A-sector productivity. A-sector might be subject to decreasing returns to scale by serious emissions. Future research should conduct a more rigorous analysis on the international environmental agreements and negotiation in Section 6 by using game theory.
Moreover, we have assumed a quasi-linear utility function that excludes an income effect. The total demand for manufactured goods remains constant even if firms relocate and prices change through the absence of taxation or a quota in South.
The constant total demand implies constant total production and hence the global emission level without any environmental policy is independent of trade costs. This has the advantage of highlighting the different effects of the two policies. We can get analytical solutions allowing us to easily compare the relocation effects of a tax and a quota. Furthermore, even if we take into account tax/quota revenue reimbursement, because we can ignore its impact, we can focus on the effects of each policy scheme just on firm location and carbon leakage. ( 1 ) ( t a a n n t a n .
18 However, it is certainly worthwhile examining the robustness of our results in the presence of an income effect. The presence of an income effect caused by relocation may cause a complete specialization in manufacturing (agriculture) in South (North), though it is an extreme and unrealistic case. Agriculture is not the numéraire any more and factor prices are determined by the trade balance and factor markets. In this case, market size and factor prices may determine emission levels.
Therefore, North's emission level under a quota is higher than under a tax for any trade costs, . Therefore, we show that an endogenously determined quota price is always less than the tax rate, given the same emission target in North. 
